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Abstract  
Since the formation of Afghanistan, its nature as a Pashtun state has affected all its 
international relations. On the other hand, the fact that it was originally established as 
a buffer state between Britain and Russia still governs its national integration. In this 
article I examine Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbors through an investigation 
of its history and the present conditions of its borders with its southern, western and 
northern neighbors. My aim is to obtain an overall perspective of Afghanistan’s 
relations with its neighbors, historically decisive elements, and the aftermath of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. 
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1. The Nature of State in Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan’s name tells us much about its unique historical circumstances. As is 
generally known, the “-stan” at the end of the name indicates a place or country in 
Persian, as can be seen with other names such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan. The focus of 
the discussion is the first half, namely “Afghan.” 
 On the assumption that “Afghanistan means land of Afghans,” Louis Dupree in 
the introduction of his classic book Afghanistan argues that “Afghan” corresponds to the 
Persian word, faghan, meaning “grieve,” and was used as a name to a specific race for 
the first time in documents of the Sassanian dynasty in the third century A.D. (Dupree 
1980: p.xvii). 
 In his book The Pathans, which discusses this point, Olaf Caroe introduces the 
inscription of the first Shapur in Naqsh-i-Rustam, as the “only reference to a race in the 
eastern frontier in Sassanian dynasty” (Caroe, p.79). It was clear that the name 
“Afghan” was used by others, not themselves.  
 In addition, Vogelsang writes as follows about “Afghans” in his History and 
Culture of Afghanistan: “The name perhaps occurs in Varaha Mihira’s Brhat-Samhita, a 
Sanskrit work from the Indian subcontinent of the early sixth century, under the ethnic 
appellation of the Avaganas (Vogelsang, p.17).” 
 It is safe to say that this ethnic group was recognized by this name in Iran 
(Persia) and the Indian subcontinent at that time, even if it was used only by others. 
 Another question is to what extent the historical Afghans overlap with the 
current Pashtuns. Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that the “Afghans“ were one of 
the dominant races in the region. 
 Therefore, the name of this country, meaning “land/country of the 
Afghans/Pashtuns,” gives some justification to the idea that the Pashtuns were the 
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dominant ethnic group in this land. 
 At this point we change our perspective, and take a general view of the ethnic 
composition of present Afghanistan. The only census ever taken was an imperfect one, 
implemented in 1979, and the current estimation is based on it. Therefore the available 
data on ethnic composition, which is important for the formation of a democratic system, 
is extremely insufficient. 
 According to the CIA World Factbook, which is freely accessible on the Internet, 
the Pashtun, the largest ethnic group in the country, account for 42% of the population, 
but do not form an absolute majority. Afghanistan’s population is about 30 million, 
according to estimates made in 2005, meaning that there are 12 to 13 million Pashtun 
people. On the other hand, Pashtu speakers constitute about 8% of Pakistan’s 
population of 152 million in 2004, next to Punjabi, Sindi and Siraike speakers. 
 Thus, the 25 million Pashtuns are almost evenly divided between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. But they constitute a minority within the large population of Pakistan, 
whereas they form a relative majority in Afghanistan. 
 In a sense, the 1893 Durand Line, which divided the Pashtuns between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, made the relations of theses two country a very complex one, 
as if they were Siamese twins. 
 Another important fact for understanding Afghanistan is that this region was 
never an independent kingdom except during the reign of the Ghaznavi Dynasty 
(977-1150), and was integrated after a revolt in 1709 by Mir Weis, who was from 
Dorrani, a Pashtun family. 
 The Dorrani clan is also known by the name of its founder, Abdali. The fourth 
master of the clan, Zirak , who lived for more than 100 years, gave his position to his 
youngest son Popal, because the first three, led by his eldest son Baraq, had abused him 
harshly (Hayat Khan,p.57f). This story involves the divergence of the Baraqzai family 
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and Porpalzai family, which continues up until the present. As is generally known, 
former king Zahir Shah, who returned to his country in 2002, is Baraqzai, and 
President Karzai is originally Popalzai. 
 The Dorrani clan is thus divided into the Zirak group and Panjpai group, and it 
is assumed that the social position of former is higher. Today, however, neither functions 
as a unified group. The Zirac group consists of four families (Popalzai, Alakzai, Baraqzai, 
and Musazai) and the Panjpai group is composed of five (Nurza, Alizai, Ishaqzai, 
Haqwani, and Maku). 
 Of them, the Popalzai family is the most famous, as kings have belonged to it 
since Ahmad Shah, and because it unified the Abdali clan. It is said that they have 
handed down an order (farman) from the first Safavie’ king Ismail, as a proof of their 
position. Most of them now live around Kandahar and are engaged in agriculture and 
pasturing. They are proud of their nobility and bravery. 
 The Baraqzai family, who reside in the Helmand valley in the southern part of 
Kandahar (this can be the reason of Mitsuo Ozaki’s travels in this area with Davood 
Khan in 1937), have a greater population than the Porpalzai, but are said to be inferior 
in bravery. They have held the leading position among the Pashtuns since Dust 
Mohammad Khan (1818-38; 1842-63)(Hayat Khan,64f). 
 In a sense, tracing the detailed genealogy centered on the royal family is 
looking back at the history of Afghanistan. Doing so may help us to concretely 
understand the principle of legitimacy and integration in this country. However when 
we raise the question why genealogy plays such a central role in Afghanistan history, it 
becomes an issue of the characteristics of Afghanistan as a nation. 
 In Afghanistan, people generally had a very limited consciousness of the king, 
and the king also had little awareness of the people as citizens.  
 Mitsuo Ozaki’s diary contains good references about this issue. Attending a full 
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dress ceremony at Salamkhaneh palace, he was surprised by the noisiness of the court, 
and writes ”the attitude toward the king is quite different from ours, and it seems that 
the king is only an executioner of power.” 
 While the king (Zahir Shah) was from a prestigious Pashtun family and was 
respected for it, for Ozaki, comparing him with the prewar emperor (Tenno) of Japan, it 
was evident that the king was no more than a politically powerful personage. 
 A landlocked nation that is divided by the Hidukush mountain, Afghanistan’s 
geographical conditions produce a strong wall of tribalism that blocks all ruling systems 
from effectively covering the whole country. 
 One of the defining elements of Afghanistan as a nation is the presence of 
Pashtunic tribalism at the national scale. Afghanistan clearly consists of an extreme 
diversity of racial and linguistic groups. But it is also certain that after the 18th century, 
the country symbolically maintained a “democratic” system of consensus building 
between the different ethnic groups. This model was adopted from the Pashtun’s 
consensus building system. 
 Dupree described Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion as a classical 
Asian-African “peasant-tribal society.” In his study, written just after Davood Khan’s 
1973 coup, Dupree presents an alternative model for Afghanistan as a nation based on a 
“contract between state and tribes” instead of a modern model of “contract between 
state and individuals”. 
 As for the idea of an application of such a substitute model, it may be said that 
it was kept alive in the form of Loya-Jirga for example by the Kabul government after 
the Taliban. However, it must also be said that the shape that the central power will 
take in the future will depend on its relations with local warlords, a problem that has 
not been addressed yet. 
 The main reason why rule by a “military clique” creates difficulties for the 
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integration of Afghanistan is not that such groups derive their rule from military power 
or lack of legitimacy in a democratic system. Rather, it is because such groups can easily 
become representatives of foreign interests (neighboring countries and superpowers). Of 
course it is also a fact that the current government itself exists thanks only to the strong 
support of foreign powers. 
 It is sometimes argued that as long as the Durand Line exists as a border, the 
transformation of Afghanistan into a modern homogeneous state will be nearly 
impossible. However, considering the Pashtunistan movement, which arose several 
times in the 1960s and 70s but brought no result, rebuilding the Afghanistan state with 
the current borders remains the only realistic choice. 
 Taking the present conditions as a starting point, it is obvious that the 
existence of Afghanistan as a state must be conditioned by its relations to its neighbors, 
particularly Pakistan. In addition, as has already been mentioned, this relationship also 
characterizes Afghanistan as a state. 
 To grasp the geopolitical characteristics of Afghanistan, we begin our 
discussion from its borders. In this case, as has already been said, the Durand Line is 
the most important issue. This line, which was the de facto borderline with India before 
1947, has since become the more official borderline with Pakistan and a cultural border 
with South Asia. 
 The country’s western border with Iran has attracted less attention, except for 
the long dispute over water from the Helmand River. Finally, the borders with three 
countries, namely Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, have divided tribes and 
races between Afghanistan and neighboring countries, bringing about both diversity 
and weakness to Afghanistan. 
 I will now examine the related issues with these borders in a sequential 
manner. 
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2. A Look at Afghanistan from the Southern Border 
 
The Durand Line, which was drawn in 1893 by Britain, had an important and definite 
meaning for the existence of an Afghanistan state. Here we will outline only the most 
basic issues regarding this line. 
 To begin with, the Durand Line was an agreement between the British Indian 
foreign secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand and the Afghan King, Amir Abdul Rahman 
Khan over several items, signed in November 12, 1893. Although there was a somewhat 
concrete description about particularly problematic areas such as Chaman, other 
problems such as the Mohmand area in the Peshawar were left for future negotiations. 
In addition, this agreement was treated as a set with the withdrawal of the Afghan 
army from the northern part of Oksus river on the Russian border (based on an 
agreement made by the British and Russians in 1873), which made clear the British 
and Russian intent to make Afghanistan a buffer state. 
 According to Adamec, the Britain insisted that this agreement was “a personal” 
one with Abdul Rahman, but was at the same time a permanent border. The agreement 
was followed by the 1919 Rawalpindi peace agreement on the India-Afghanistan border 
and the 1921 Kabul agreement, which is currently valid.   
 Ozaki describes the actual circumstances of the border as follows: 
“Understanding it as a wide, belt-shaped border may be more proper than as a single 
line.” 
 However, the Line, while being a de facto border with India and since 1947 
with Pakistan, became the main target of attacks from Pashtun nationalists of the 
“Pashtunistan” movement. 
 But what should be pointed out here is that the foundation of “Pashtunistan” 
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would lead to a dramatic change in the prevailing balance with other minority groups in 
current Afghanistan for Pashtuns, and would not be welcomed even by Pashtuns 
themselves. In addition, the penetration of Pashtun tribalism into Afghanistan could 
possibly bring about a situation similar to the Taliban era (Adamec, 2003, P.405). It 
could as well be said that the Taliban government in Afghanistan was a changed form of 
the Pashtunistan movement. 
 Though the Pashtunistan movement underwent an upsurge in the 1950s and 
after the 1973 Davood Khan coup, in a sense it always existed as an undercurrent in 
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations after 1947. 
 Abdul Ghaffar Khan is one of the symbols of the Pashtunistan movement. He 
did not insist on the independence of Pashtun areas or deny India-Pakistan separation, 
but instead aimed to found a united independent country covering a vast area. His 
espousal of Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolence earned him the title of the “Frontier 
Gandhi.” He objected to the separation of India and Pakistan, and insisted on the 
independence of “Patanistan.” As a secular thinker, he led many political organizations 
spiritually, the most famous being the “Volunteers of God.” He acquired Pakistani 
nationality, but was imprisoned for a long time there. Because of his earnest love for 
Afghanistan, he received a warm reception there. He died in Peshawar in 1988, but 
according to his will was buried in Jalal Abad in Afghanistan. 
 His movement lost its vitality without seeing any concrete fruition. In a totally 
different context, a strategic plan which recognizes the area from India and Pakistan to 
Central Asia as a single vast region is being promoted by the U.S. government (Chapter 
2). President Bush’s visit to Afghanistan on March 1 this year and his speech on March 
3 in India clearly show that the U.S. government intends to position India as a strategic 
partner in the region. 
 Another reason for the importance of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area is 
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that an enormous share of the world’s opium flows out of Afghanistan onto the 
international market through the border. Furthermore, even though the U.S. army has 
carried out repeated operations in this region, it is still a threat to the international 
order with the so-called “Talibanization” of north-eastern Pakistan after September 11. 
 The origins of these problems are related to Afghanistan’s southern border, the 
Durand Line, and this tells us that the autonomy of Pashtuns in this area deeply affects 
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. 
 
3. A Look at Afghanistan from the Western Border 
 
Afghanistan is bounded in the west by a 936-km border with Iran extending from north 
to south. The southern part was established by Henry MacMohan in 1905, and is called 
the McMohan Line. The northern part, the Fafh-ali Line was defined in 1934 after the 
mediation of Turkish general Altai. 
 The Iranian side of border includes Mashad, Torbat-e-Heidariye and Birjand in 
Khorasan province and Sistan in the south, and there is cultural continuity with Herat 
in Afghanistan. Herat is recognized as a center of Iranian culture inside Afghanistan’s 
borders. In turn, the east edge of Iran, it is known as a region where there are many 
Sunnis, and the border divides the Iranian Shiahs from Sunnis of Afghanistan and the 
Central Asia.  
 Until recent years, a dispute between the two countries over the water 
resources of the Helmand River in Sistan has attracted international attention. 
According to Abidi, this problem was the main dispute between the two countries until 
the “Agreement of the Helmand’s water supply” in 1973 and its ratification in 1977. 
 The disagreement was not a constant one, but usually emerged in times of 
drought. Iran, which is located downstream, was more serious in searching for a 
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solution, and the two sides gave gropes for a political solution. However, for Iran it was 
a problem involving a remote region, and so it was not very serious in seeking an 
international decision. Based on the idea that international relations are more 
important than the development of the region, Iran’s approach was very cautious, 
though the problem continued for a long time. 
 Today, the Systan region is attracting international attention again, this time 
because Chabahar port on the Oman Sea is being redeveloped as a base for the 
transportation of goods to Afghanistan via Zabol. 
 Though this is a long route to Kabul, it provides good access to the main cities 
of landlocked Afghanistan, such as Heart and Qandahar, and it seems verly likely that 
it will become one of the main arteries. 
 It seems that after 9/11, Iranian-Afghanistan relation have the potential to 
develop in an amicable manner, but there is also grounds for rivalry between Iran and 
Pakistan. Pakistan has already launched the development of Gwadar port, 180 km east 
of Chabahar. This does not need to be an obstacle for the future development of 
Chahbahar, but it has to be watched. One the other hand, after the collapse of Taliban, 
which had harsh conflicts with Iran, Iran has always been conscious of the national 
interests of Pakistan. 
 Considering the changing situation in Afghanistan and with an eye on India, 
Iran is working to develop amicable relations in the region. Its plan to build a natural 
gas pipeline to India through Pakistan, which began to move forward again in June 
2005, might be related to this improvement. 
 Historically it was assumed that the three countries of Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan should form a regional union. For instance, Dupree examines the possibility of 
this federal formation from the cultural context. Saying that it is “out of the question 
…because of their disparate governmental systems,” he insists, “the idea of an economic  
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common market of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan (and possibly other Middle Eastern 
nations and India) may be attractive” (Dupree 1963, p.391; p.397). It is true that one of 
the big obstacles for this great design was removed when the Cold War ended. 
 
4. A Look at Afghanistan from the Northern Border 
 
Afghanistan’s borderline to the north was established by negotiations between Russia, 
which was carrying out a policy of southern advance throughout the 19th century, and 
Britain, which basically opposed the policy. Afghanistan could hardly take part in this 
international process. The circumstances leading to the settlement of the border can be 
divided into three parts. 
 The western part, from Iran’s border to Khame-ab on Amu Darya’s southern 
bank, first was settled in 1873 under a British-Russia agreement, but after a clash in 
Panjdeh in the north of Herat, Ridgeline became the borderline. After Britain offered 
Afghan neutrality towards Russian policy of southern advance in 1869, Amu Darya 
River was recognized as a borderline of the two countries between Khame-ab and 
Zoorkul Lake in 1873. The borderline in the area between Zoorkul Lake and Jamin Pass 
was decided by the British-Russian Pamir committee in 1896. 
 Today, the northern borderline is divided into a 744 km border with 
Turkmenistan (Ridgeline and the western part of the Amu Darya River), a 137 km 
border with Uzbekistan (partly on the Amu Darya River), and a 1,206 km border with 
Tajikistan (most on the Amu Darya and Pamir Rivers). 
 The current situation, under which Uzbeks and Tajiks are divided over the 
border lines between Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, adds an element of 
complexity to the process of integration and reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
 According to Natalya Khan, many of the Uzbeks who now reside in 
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Afghanistan were people who fled in by the aftermath of the Basmachi movement in the 
1920s and 1930s. After World War II, the Socialist Republic of Uzbek became deeply 
engaged in development aid to Afghanistan. After the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, a considerable number of Afghan students went to Tashkent University to 
study. 
 After the withdrawal of the Soviet army in 1989 and the collapse of the 
Najibullah regime in 1992, the flow of Afghan refugees into Uzbekistan accelerated. In 
1993, about 8,000 Afghans were residing there. Later, the Uzbekistan government did 
not allow further investigations, and it is impossible to make an accurate assessment of 
the number of Afghan refugees. But because the border between the two countries has 
been comparatively far from battlefields and because of Uzbekistan’s strict refugee 
policy, it seems that the number of refugees hasn’t increased much. 
 One may gain the impression that relations between Afghanistan and the 
Central Asian countries have not developed much since the sweeping away of the 
Taliban, but in fact they are now waiting to see how regional relations are reorganized 
and how the dynamic changes deriving from Afghanistan reconstruction will reach 
them.  
 It seems that Russian’s attitude toward further participation in this region will 
be a decisive factor. It is not irrelevant in this regard that Russia has played an 
important part in the recent Iranian nuclear problem. After the end of the Iran-Iraq 
War in 1988, relations between Russia and Iran have basically become friendly, and 
have not changed much since. The Putin Administration quickly welcomed the election 
of hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president, which tells us how much it values its 
strategic relation with Iran. 
 
5. Conclusions  
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Our impression based on the above considerations is that after September 11, the 
retreat of Taliban and the national and international aftermath of those events, the 
international relations surrounding Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and the central Asian 
countries became a matter of political tactics based on old geopolitical regional rules, 
very much like the great game of the 19th century.  
 This is deeply related to the dismantlement of the Cold War structure of 
international relations and contains the new element of changes in Iran’s international 
position after the 1979 revolution. On the other hand, the main factor that regulates 
international relations in the region is the existence of the structure of old 
confrontations which developed from the dynamics of international politics over 
borderlines and local tribalism. 
 There is, in some ways, a resemblance between today’s situation and that in 
the 1950 and 1960s. While many states are trying to expand their influence in 
Afghanistan through economic assistance, countries like Iran and Pakistan want to 
form a new cooperative relationship, sometimes in confrontation with the will of 
powerful states. In addition, considering in the current surge of Japanese interest in 
Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s expanding expectations from Japan, there may be 
common elements with the late 1930s, when Ozaki was active in Afghanistan. 
 In closing, I would like to touch on a very serious issue, which was not 
mentioned in this article: the role of Islam in the integration of the Afghanistan state. 
The majority of the Afghan people are still peasants, and they generally have strong 
religious beliefs. This Islamic faith is strongly tied to a mass nationalism (love for the 
hometown). 
 Ozaki writes in his long-hidden diary that; “members of the clergy have a 
dreadful power” (Ozaki 2003, P.224). Adamec expresses almost the same 
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impression; ”Amir (the king) never disregards the opinion of a mollah, even a 
low-ranking one” (Adamec1967, P.7). 
 As is generally known, the official name of the country since the enactment of 
the new constitution in 2004 is “The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” This means that 
Islam, which almost all people follow, should be the main principle for the integration of 
Afghanistan. 
 It is possible to classify Afghanistan’s neighboring countries as follows: 
Pakistan as a similar Islamic state, Iran as a Shiite state, and the central Asian 
countries as secular states. But a more important point is that the way in which the 
existence of native and religious authorities overlaps with the ethnic composition and 
geographic conditions is closely related to the future process of reconstruction and 
integration of Afghanistan. I would like to add that for considering Afghanistan in the 
future, all of the above-mentioned problems are very important.  
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